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LABoR I.Aw-FEDERAL PRE-EMPTION-LIMITATIONS ON STATE JURISDICTION 
IN CAUSES ArusING OUT OF LABoR DISPUTES-Respondent employers refused 
to enter a union shop agreement with the petitioning unions, who then 
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began to picket peacefully and to exert pressure on respondents' suppliers 
and customers to persuade them to cease dealing with respondents. Re-
spondents initiated a representation proceeding before the NLRB, which 
declined jurisdiction on the ground respondents' business did not have a 
sufficient effect on commerce to meet the NLRB's self-imposed jurisdictional 
standards. Respondents then sought and obtained damages and an injunc-
tion in the California courts.1 On certiorari to the United States Supreme 
Court the injunction order was reversed, but the question of damages was 
remanded to the state court since it was unclear whether the damages were 
sustained under California or federal law.2 The state court sustained the 
damages on the basis of state law.3 On certiorari to the United States Su-
preme Court, held, reversed, four justices concurring in result only.4 Absent 
an NLRB determination that an activity is neither protected nor prohib-
ited, or compelling precedent applied to essentially undisputed facts, state 
courts have no jurisdiction to award damages for losses arising out of such 
activity even if based on tort liability theories under state law. San Diego 
Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). 
The corrective measures of section 701 (a) of the recent Labor-Manage-
ment Reporting and Disclosure Act5 will alleviate much of the distress 
which was created when the NLRB carved out the so-called no-man's-land 
by declining jurisdiction on its own monetary standards.6 In this area, 
where the impact on commerce is existent but relatively slight, states are 
now free to regulate labor-management relations without regard to whether 
the regulated conduct is otherwise federally protected or prohibited by the 
amended National Labor Relations Act.7 Thus the principal case is no 
longer significant in this former no-man's-land. But in cases satisfying the 
NLRB's jurisdictional standards, the new statute has no effect and the 
principal case remains authoritative. 
In previously attempting to outline areas where state regulation of labor 
problems was excluded, the Court created a welter of confusion. This 
145 Cal. (2d) 657, 291 P. (2d) 1 (1955). 
2353 U.S. 26 (1957). 
a 49 Cal. (2d) 595, 320 P. (2d) 473 (1958). 
4 Justices Harlan, Clark, Whittaker, and Stewart concurred. 
Ii H. Rep. 1147, 86th Cong., 1st sess., p. 3181 (1959), 25 U.S. LAW WEEK 5 (1959). 
This section amends §14 of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, by adding sub-
sections (c) (1) and (c) (2). Subsection (c) (1) provides that the NLRB may decline 
jurisdiction over labor disputes which the Board feels do not have a substantial effect on 
commerce. Subsection (c) (2) provides that where the Board declines jurisdiction pursuant 
to § (c) (I), the act shall not be deemed to prevent the states from asserting jurisdiction. 
6 In 1954 the NLRB withdrew its plenary jurisdiction from a number of areas on the 
basis of a marked upward swing in the dollar volume criteria applied, thus leaving a vast 
area of labor-management relations unregulated. See Press Release R. 449, July 15, 1954, 
as reported in 34 L.R.R.M. 75 (1954). This was changed again on October 2, 1958, by 
Press Release R. 576, but the changes leave unaffected the statements in this note. See 5 
CCH Llll, L. REP., 4th ed., ,r50,086, ,r50,092 (1958). 
'1 Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947, 61 Stat. 136, 29 U.S.C. (1952) §151 et seq. 
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confusion originated in Garner v. Teamsters Union, A.F.L.,B where to pro-
mote uniform substantive and procedural rules over subject matter within 
the NLRB's purview, the Court held that a state may not afford relief for 
conduct subject to NLRB regulatioi;i.9 This sweeping declaration was later 
given a restrictive interpretation in United Construction Workers v. La-
burnum Construction Corp.,10 which held that the LMRA did not pre-
empt state tort remedies. The manner in which Laburnum would be con-
strued and the extent of its projection was conjectural at the time. Nar-
rowly construed, Laburnum would permit state damage remedies only in 
cases of violence.11 However, the language of that opinion strongly sug-
gested that the pre-emption idea precluded only conflicting remedies.1 2 
This view was seemingly adopted in two subsequent decisions which award-
ed damages to employees for economic rather than personal injury or prop-
erty losses.13 Although it appeared in both instances that the NLRB, by 
exercising its discretionary back-pay powers, could have afforded a similar 
remedy, the remedy for loss of wages given by the state courts was held not 
to conflict with any remedy given by the federal act.14 In the principal 
S 346 U.S. 485 (1953). 
9 Id. at 499-500. Justice Frankfurter stated, "The detailed prescription of a procedure 
for restraint of specified types of picketing would seem to imply that other picketing is to 
be free of other methods and sources of restraint. For the policy of the National Labor 
Management Relations Act is not to condemn all picketing but only that ascertained by 
its prescribed processes to fall within its prohibitions." 
10 347 U.S. 656 (1954). 
11 Id. at 658-659. Certiorari was granted with regard to the "type of conduct" in-
volved. See Meltzer, "The Supreme Court, Congress, and State Jurisdiction Over Labor 
Relations: I," 59 CoL. L. REv. 6 at 31-32 (1959). 
12 Justice Burton, speaking for the Court in Laburnum (347 U.S. 656 at 665), em-
phasized the lack of conflicting remedies and stated: "To the extent ... Congress has not 
prescribed procedure for dealing with the consequences of tortious conduct • • . there is 
no ground for concluding that •.• liabilities for tortious conduct have been eliminated. 
The care we took in the Garner case to demonstrate the existing conflict .•• was, itself, a 
recognition that if no conflict had existed, the state procedure would have survived." 
(Emphasis added.) See note, 40 CoRN. L. Q. 156 at 160 (1954). Accepting this interpreta-
tion, Laburnum should apply to peaceful as well as violent picketing. There could be no 
conflict between state and federal remedies, because the Labor-Management Relations Act, 
note 7 supra, with the exception of §10 (c), [61 Stat. 147 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §160 (c)], 
which permits discretionary back-pay, and §303 [61 Stat. 158 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §187], 
which allows damages for violations of secondary boycott provisions, does not mention 
damage awards for activities covered by §8 [61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §158]. 
To deprive plaintiff of a common law action would be to immunize the tortious conduct of 
defendant. 
13 Intl. Assn. of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958); Intl. Union, United 
Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958). 
See also Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 at 477 (1955), where the Court refers 
to the lack of conflict. 
14 Section IO (c) of the Labor-Management Relations Act, note 12 supra, provides 
authority for back-pay awards. Contrary to the majority argument that back-pay would 
effectuate the policy of the act without actually redressing the employee's injuries, Chief 
Justice Warren and Justice Douglas, who dissented in both the Russell and Gonzales cases, 
argued that an award of damages by a state court conflicted with §10 (c) remedies and 
discouraged actions before the NLRB. 
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case, however, the action was by the employer against the union, a situation 
outside the back pay powers of the NLRB.11• A fortiori, that damages would 
be allowed in this case seemed unquestionable. Nevertheless, the Court 
disallowed damages and in so doing impliedly overruled all prior language 
suggesting that it was the conflicting nature of the state remedy, rather than 
the nature of the conduct, which precluded state jurisdiction. Moreover, in 
recharting the area of federal supremacy, the Court's holding seems to have 
drawn the circle of permissible state regulation even tighter. Although the 
Court might have intended to preserve the integrity of state authority in 
well-settled areas such as violence, its language seems to restrict state au-
thority even here. Giving the holding a literal interpretation, it would 
seem that in the future almost every case will require a primary determina-
tion by the NLRB. Only when the facts of a case are identical to precedent 
cases where state-given remedies have been allowed and are essentially un-
disputed by either party, which is highly improbable, will a state be au-
thorized to hear a case otherwise falling within the jurisdiction of the NLRB. 
This pervasiveness seems effectually to undermine reliance on precedents in 
all unprotected areas formerly left to the states, since any dispute will re-
quire an NLRB determination as to the essential facts regardless of whether 
the activity has previously been held to fall within an unprotected category.16 
Initially, the concurring opinion, which dissents from all but the result, 
appears more liberal since the concurrers would allow the states to assert 
jurisdiction where the activities are neither protected nor prohibited,17 or 
where the activities are unprotected and prohibited but no conflict of 
remedies exists.18 Yet the fact that they believe that the NLRB might 
have found the activity in the principal case to be protected seems to imply 
recognition of the basic reality that controversies would arise in almost 
any case as to whether the activity was protected or not. Although the 
concurring justices would allow states to give damage remedies with regard 
to prohibited and unprotected activities, the necessity of a primary NLRB 
determination of whether the activity in a particular case was protected, 
prohibited, or unprotected would render their views not significantly di-
vergent from those of the majority. Nevertheless, the decision is arguably 
justifiable in view of the desire for a uniform national labor policy. To 
allow a state to be the arbiter of what is protected or prohibited would be 
15 Section 10 (c), note 12 supra, expressly permits back pay only for employees. 
16 E.g., Allen-Bradley v. WERB, 315 U.S. 740 (1942) (intermittent work stoppages); 
Algoma Plywood and Veneer Co. v. WERB, 336 U.S. 301 (1949) (cease and desist order and 
order for reinstatement with back pay); Intl. Union, UAW, AFL v. WERB, 336 U.S. 245 
(1949) (intermittent work stoppages). 
17 Principal case at 251, 253-254. 
18 Principal case at 251-252. On this ground Justice Harlan concludes that he 
"would adhere to the Laburnum and Russell distinction between damages and injunctions." 
Id. at 254. 
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to_ imperil the supremacy of the federal act.19 Moreover, to concede state 
jurisdiction because the remedy afforded is damages rather than an in-
junction would be merely to condone an approach from the rear where one 
has already been foreclosed from the front.20 
Robert ]. Margolin, S.Ed. 
19 Principal case at 244. See the discussion of this question in Meltzer, "The 
Supreme Court, Congress, and State Jurisdiction Over Labor Relations: I," 59 CoL. L. 
REv. 6 at 39 (1959). 
20 While a reversal of an erroneous judgment for damages will restore a defendant to 
his status quo, the strength of a strike might be dissipated before an injunction could be 
dissolved. Some have argued this difference justifies allowing states to give the damage 
remedy which is not offered in Labor-Management Relations Act. See comment, 35 TElt. 
L. REv. 555 at 566 (1957). 
